Monetary Policy, Commodity Prices and Infl ation – Empirical Evidence from the US by Florian Verheyen
RUHR
ECONOMIC PAPERS
Monetary Policy, Commodity Prices
and Inﬂ  ation
Empirical Evidence from the US
#216
Florian VerheyenImprint
Ruhr Economic Papers 
Published by
Ruhr-Universität Bochum (RUB), Department of Economics
Universitätsstr. 150, 44801 Bochum, Germany
Technische Universität Dortmund, Department of Economic and Social Sciences
Vogelpothsweg 87, 44227 Dortmund, Germany
Universität Duisburg-Essen, Department of Economics
Universitätsstr. 12, 45117 Essen, Germany
Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
Hohenzollernstr. 1-3, 45128 Essen, Germany
Editors 
Prof. Dr. Thomas K. Bauer
RUB, Department of Economics, Empirical Economics
Phone: +49 (0) 234/3 22 83 41, e-mail: thomas.bauer@rub.de
Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Leininger
Technische Universität Dortmund, Department of Economic and Social Sciences
Economics – Microeconomics
Phone: +49 (0) 231/7 55-3297, email: W.Leininger@wiso.uni-dortmund.de
Prof. Dr. Volker Clausen
University of Duisburg-Essen, Department of Economics
International Economics
Phone: +49 (0) 201/1 83-3655, e-mail: vclausen@vwl.uni-due.de
Prof. Dr. Christoph M. Schmidt
RWI, Phone: +49 (0) 201/81 49-227, e-mail: christoph.schmidt@rwi-essen.de
Editorial Oﬃ   ce 
Joachim Schmidt
RWI, Phone: +49 (0) 201/81 49-292, e-mail: joachim.schmidt@rwi-essen.de
Ruhr Economic Papers #216 
Responsible Editor: Volker Clausen
All rights reserved. Bochum, Dortmund, Duisburg, Essen, Germany, 2010
ISSN 1864-4872 (online) – ISBN 978-3-86788-248-4
The working papers published in the Series constitute work in progress circulated to 
stimulate discussion and critical comments. Views expressed represent exclusively the 
authors’ own opinions and do not necessarily reﬂ  ect those of the editors.Ruhr Economic Papers #216
Florian Verheyen
Monetary Policy, Commodity Prices
and Inﬂ  ation
Empirical Evidence from the USBibliograﬁ  sche Informationen 
der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek
Die Deutsche Bibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der deutschen National-
bibliograﬁ  e; detaillierte bibliograﬁ  sche Daten sind im Internet über: 
http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufb  ar.
ISSN 1864-4872 (online)
ISBN 978-3-86788-248-4Florian Verheyen1
Monetary Policy, Commodity Prices and 
Inﬂ  ation – Empirical Evidence from the 
US
Abstract
The past years were characterized by unprecedented rises in prices of commodities such 
as oil or wheat and inﬂ  ation rates moved up above the mark of two percent per annum. 
This led to a revival of the debate whether commodity prices indicate future CPI inﬂ  ation 
and if they can be used as indicator variables for central banks or not. We apply various 
econometric methods like Granger causality tests and SVAR models to US data. The 
results corroborate the notion that there was a strong link between commodity prices 
and CPI inﬂ  ation in the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. For a more recent sample, 
the relationship has weakened, respectively diminished.
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1. Introduction
At least for the past twenty years,
2 there has been a debate among economists if commodity 
prices should play a role in the conduct of monetary policy and the attainment of its ultimate 
goal of price stability. Price stability is commonly referred to as an annual increase in the con-
sumer price index (CPI) of around two percent in the medium term.
3 As inflation comes along 
with several economic and social problems such as relative price shifts or a transfer of wealth 
from lenders to borrowers, defending price stability is evidently one main goal of economic 
and social politics. 
Awokuse and Yang (2003) hint at a possible signalling function of commodity prices which 
points to an unsustainable growth which should be depressed by central banks to avoid infla-
tion. Cody and Mills (1991) even argue that a response of the Federal Reserve (Fed) to com-
modity price increases would have led to lower and less volatile inflation rates without affect-
ing the output. 
Considering that the debate about commodity prices and inflation started in the 1980s, one 
might be tempted to believe that this issue is somewhat stale, but the discussion revived dur-
ing the past years when commodity prices such as oil or food reached all time highs and infla-
tion rates moved up all around the globe.
4 So Blomberg and Harris (1995) seem to be right 
when they argue that the interest in this topic varies with the level of commodity prices. 
After the oil price shocks of the 1970s, when annual consumer price inflation in the United 
States reached values of above 13%,
5 inflation rates were reduced and swung around two per-
cent in the last decade, meaning that central banks were quite successful in achieving their 
primary objective of low and stable inflation rates. Several factors led to this development 
called the “Great Moderation”. Melick and Galati (2006) identify the more sensible wage set-
ting process, an augmented productivity, a trimmed down pass-through of energy prices and 
lower inflation expectations as reasons. Another frequently heard explanation is an improved 
monetary policy due to more central bank independence (Borio and Filardo, 2007). 
However, recent dynamics in commodity markets stirred up inflation rates and caused fear of 
a period with inflation rates above central bank’s targets (Bermingham, 2008). Certainly, the 
2 See for instance Boughton et al. (1989), Furlong (1989) or Cody and Mills (1991). 
3 While most central banks refer to the CPI when talking about price stability, it is not undisputed to take the CPI 
as the appropriate measure of inflation. See for example Alchian and Klein (1973), who were the first who argue 
that a price index should contain asset prices. 
4 Latest examples are Browne and Cronin (2007), Bhar and Hamori (2008) or Cecchetti and Moessner (2008) or 
ECB (2010). 
5 The view that the oil price shocks were responsible for the high inflation rates is challenged for example by 
Barsky and Kilian (2002). 5
overheated commodity markets have calmed down somewhat since the mid of 2008 due to the 
recession caused by the subprime crisis, but right now we are facing again a strong rise of 
commodities such as crude oil and gold. While the price of crude oil has fallen since its all 
time high of mid 2008, its evolution has already turned around and the spot price of crude oil 
has more than doubled in half a year since December 2008. Analysts expect even a further 
rise in the medium term up to 90-100 US-$ per barrel (Marschall and Beyerle, 2009). 
The reason why commodity prices might be of use for monetary policy is the fact that they 
might serve as indicators of future consumer price inflation. Cheung (2009) for example finds 
supportive evidence of this hypothesis. When strong commodity price increases signal infla-
tionary pressure, it could be reasonable for central banks to react to these developments. 
Further reason for the discussion about commodity prices, inflation and monetary policy can 
be seen in the relaxing connection between money supply and inflation (Cody and Mills, 
1991). This uncoupling holds true especially today. The low interest rates set by central banks 
in the aftermath of the 11
th September 2001 fuelled markets with ample liquidity. The same 
holds true for the actual financial crisis which central banks try to fight with historical low 
interest rates. The Fed has lowered the Federal Funds Rate to almost zero percent. While this 
leads to a huge amount of liquidity all around the globe, searching for yield, we will investi-
gate, whether commodity prices will exhibit inflationary pressures earlier than the CPI.  
In order to do this, the proceeding of this paper is as follows: Section two reviews the theory 
of commodity prices, monetary policy and inflation. Reasons for and against a faster reaction 
of commodity prices to changes in economic conditions are presented. In section three, we 
take a look at commodity prices as indicator variables for monetary policy. The fourth part 
contains an empirical investigation. By using econometric techniques such as Granger causal-
ity tests or structural vector autoregressions (SVARs), attempts are made to answer the ques-
tion what the connection between commodity and consumer prices in the US is like. The fifth 
and last section concludes and gives some policy implications. 
2. Theory of commodity prices and inflation 
When studying the literature, the reader will find various reasons for and against a quicker 
reaction of commodity prices in comparison with prices of consumer goods. The most obvi-
ous one is the fact that commodities are traded in auction markets (Cody and Mills, 1991). 
Under rational expectations, the price today will contain all the information available and so it 
will anticipate the future price (Adams and Ichino, 1995). This means that commodity prices 6
change immediately when new information is available and prices of final goods react quite 
sluggishly, probably due to the fact that they are restricted by contracts or because of menu 
costs. Following from this argument, commodity prices might affect inflation via expectations. 
Is the perception of an increase of commodity prices to be durable, inflation expectations and 
thus wage claims might rise and so will probably end up in a higher price level. Furthermore, 
a rise of commodity prices can indicate a general increase in global demand for final goods 
and as a result point to inflationary pressure (Cheung, 2009). 
Another reason for fast moving commodity prices can be seen in different price elasticities of 
supply of commodities and consumer goods (Belke et al. 2009). The price elasticity of supply 
of consumer goods is infinity, following that rising demand for consumer goods can easily be 
met by supply from emerging markets. For commodities the situation is different. Their price 
elasticity is very low, meaning that higher demand cannot be satisfied instantaneously, though 
prices must react to equilibrate the market. 
Bordo (1980) explains the different speeds of adjustment by contract theory. Sectors which 
are characterized especially by long lasting contracts will not exhibit fast price movements. 
When deciding between a long and a short-term contract, one has to weigh two sorts of costs. 
First, there are searching and negotiation costs which have to be paid every time a new con-
tract is made and second, there are costs of being engaged in a contract. An individual or an 
enterprise has to choose the contract length that minimizes total costs. As commodities are 
highly standardized, particularly when they are just slightly processed, the search and negotia-
tion costs are deniable. So, for commodities mainly short-term contracts are signed, meaning 
that commodities will react quite fast to changing economic conditions. 
A further argument for a slower response of final goods prices can be developed by taking a 
look at the production process. While commodities are inputs for the production process, they 
influence production costs and therefore inflation of consumer goods (Garner, 1989). This 
argument is correct only insofar as one assumes that all or at least most of the rise in input 
costs is transmitted into higher consumer goods prices. However, Moosa (1998) raises the 
objection that costs for raw materials are only a minor fraction of total production costs and so 
this argument might be of only little importance. 
At last, there might be a connection between commodity prices and inflation via the use of 
commodities, especially gold, as an inflation hedge (Blomberg and Harris, 1995). Individuals 7
may buy commodities when anticipating a rise in the price level, to secure them against the 
declining value of money.
6
These theoretical considerations are quite formally presented in Frankel’s (1986) overshoot-
ing model of agricultural prices. There, he develops a formal overshooting model for com-
modity prices for a closed economy in which he adopts Dornbusch’s (1976) famous over-
shooting model for exchange rate determination to agricultural prices. Frankel (1986) shows 
how monetary policy affects commodity prices and thus inflation. An expansionary monetary 
policy results in an overshooting of commodity prices. In the short run, commodity prices 
overact because consumer goods prices are sticky and therefore cannot adjust.
7
Turning now to the other side, there are good reasons for a weakened relationship between 
commodity prices and consumer goods prices as well. Several arguments for a connection 
between commodity prices and inflation mentioned before are doubtful or disproved. In fact, 
producers might reduce their margins instead of rising prices when facing increasing input 
costs because of international competition. A reduction of the pass-through is documented 
especially for oil prices, see for example Hooker (2002), LeBlanc and Chinn (2004), De 
Gregorio et al. (2007), and White (2008). Similarly, the importance of commodities as an in-
flation hedge is declining as well (Blomberg and Harris, 1995). 
Blanchard and Galí (2008) investigate the differences between the actual oil price shocks and 
the oil price shocks of the 1970s with a vector autoregressive (VAR) model for the US and 
five other industrial countries. They name four reasons for a lower influence of oil price 
shocks on the economy and conclude after their examination that all of these are responsible 
for the weaker effects of the actual oil price shocks. To name them, there is at first pure luck. 
By this Blanchard and Galí (2008) mean that not oil alone is responsible for the strong nega-
tive impact on the economic performance during and after a large rise of oil prices. In the 
1970s other shocks prevailed contemporaneously. A second reason is the reduced oil intensity 
in production,
8 due to the fact that demand changed from industry goods with high oil inten-
sity towards services. Additionally, productivity gains are able to mitigate the effects of com-
modity price increases (Krichene, 2008). LeBlanc and Chinn (2004) put forward that the ef-
6 This is what we have seen up to now. The price of gold has increased markedly since the beginning of the sub-
prime crisis, listing now around 1300 US-$ per ounce. 
7 The empirical evidence of the Frankel (1986) overshooting model is somewhat mixed. While the quicker reac-
tion of commodity prices is broadly confirmed, the overshooting hypothesis is often rejected. See, for instance 
Devadoss and Meyers (1987), Barnhart (1989), Taylor and Spriggs (1989), Robertson and Orden (1990), Be-
longia (1991), Saghaian et al. (2002), or Browne and Cronin (2007).
8 Krichene (2008) notes that even for consumption a smaller fraction of the consumer bundle is allotted to com-
modities. This reduces the influence of commodity price changes to the CPI per definition. 8
fects of oil price shocks are all the stronger, the higher the ration of energy consumption to 
GDP is. The third reason mentioned by Blanchard and Galí (2008) is a more flexible labour 
market. While unions became weaker during the last decades and wage indexation declined, 
the effects of large supply shocks are no longer that serious as they were in the 1970s. Fourth 
and last, Blanchard and Galí (2008) see an improved monetary policy responsible for the less 
serious effects of the 2000s oil price shocks. This view is supported by Barsky and Kilian 
(2002). They ascribe the poor economic performance after the 1970s oil price shocks to the 
Fed’s monetary expansion at the beginning of the 1970s. 
Another reason that can account for a weakened relationship between commodity prices and 
the CPI can be seen in low interest rates today in comparison to high interest rates during the 
1970s and 1980s (Krichene, 2008). Nowadays producers face lower interest rate costs and 
therefore are able to cope with higher commodity prices more easily. Finally, the in general 
low inflation environment in industrial countries might be an additional reason for a mild in-
fluence of commodity price rises on the economic performance (De Gregorio et al., 2007). 
3. Commodity prices as indicator variables for monetary policy 
A reliable indicator of future inflation would facilitate monetary policy because central banks 
cannot directly control price stability in the medium term because the transmission mecha-
nism takes some time. The role of commodity prices for central banks generally depends on 
the philosophy of the central bank. If central banks put more weight on stabilizing output, the 
appropriate reaction to a commodity price shock might be a reduction in interest rates. On the 
other hand, when the main objective of the central bank is stabilizing inflation rates, the cor-
rect response to rising commodity prices is raising interest rates (LeBlanc and Chinn, 2004). 
Thus, especially the Fed is somewhat in a quandary as it has to consider both low and stable 
inflation and a high degree of employment. 
At first we will turn to the profile of an indicator. An overview is presented for instance by 
Roth (1986) or Angell (1992). The first one is a timely availability of the concrete value of the 
possible indicator variable. Secondly, the indicator should be published frequently. Both char-
acteristics facilitate a sensible and timely decision. A third factor is the issue of revision. 
Variables that are revised quite often and strongly are worthless as an indicator because the 
signal they send at the date of its publication could be the opposite of what finally comes out. 
Additionally, indicator variables need to have a constant lead over the variable of interest. The 
last prerequisite for a suitable indicator is its robustness to shocks. An indicator should not be 9
ruled by irregular influences and it should not oscillate too much. This would imply a too ac-
tivist policy which would lead to a too high degree of uncertainty for the economic agents and 
too little continuity in the policymaking process. 
Of course, there is a trade-off between some of these criteria. A high frequency indicator is 
generally more liable to changes. So when using this indicator one has to take care that one 
does not conduct a too unstable policy. One has to distinguish which short-run developments 
of commodity prices are relevant for CPI inflation and which are not (Furlong, 1989). Central 
banks might even disregard relevant information taken from commodity or asset markets be-
cause they prefer to smooth interest rates (Filardo, 2001). 
An advantage in using commodity prices in carrying out monetary policy can be seen in a 
possible improvement in international policy coordination. Commodity prices can signal 
whether inflationary pressure is caused by local or global factors.
9 Observing  commodity 
prices could thus indicate which central bank has to change its policy and in which direction 
(Angell, 1992). 
If commodity prices can serve as indicator variables is, of course, mainly an empirical ques-
tion but commodities are a promising candidate. As they are traded in auction markets, they 
contain all existing information and are reported quite frequently. And of course, commodity 
prices are not susceptible to revision and the data is directly available. However, commodities, 
as for example oil or food, are prone to irregular developments such as political instabilities in 
oil exporting countries or droughts (Adams and Ichino, 1995). To mitigate this caveat, one 
could, however, use broad commodity indices (Angell, 1992). 
A vast number of studies investigates whether commodities may serve as indicator variables 
for monetary policy or not. Boughton et al. (1989) perform Granger causality tests inter alia 
for the US. They find robust results of causation running from commodity prices to consumer 
prices for all samples. When turning to cointegration, they find a long-run relationship be-
tween commodity prices and consumer price inflation. This view is supported by Blomberg 
and Harris (1995). However as indicators of future inflation, commodity prices perform 
poorly since the mid 1980s. Blomberg and Harris (1995) do not expect a reinforcement of this 
link but can think of commodity prices as a leading indicator of global inflation pressure. 
Marquis and Cunningham (1990) underline the finding that the CPI and commodity prices are 
not cointegrated, at least not when looking at bivariate relationships. They explain this finding 
9 There is a vast literature that addresses this issue whether inflation is driven by local or global factors. See for 
example Borio and Filardo (2007) or White (2008). 10
by high volatility in commodity markets. However, adding a third variable (they use industrial 
production) leads to the finding of a cointegrating relationship. Mahdavi and Zhou (1997) 
sum up the studies of the end of the 1980s and early 1990s and report that there is Granger 
causality running from commodity prices to consumer goods’ inflation. On the other hand, for 
forecasting purposes, commodity prices are only suitable when focussing on turning points of 
consumer goods’ inflation. 
In more recent investigations, Awokuse and Yang (2003) find causality from commodity 
prices to consumer prices and thus they conclude that commodity prices can be used as indi-
cators of future inflation. This evidence is confirmed by Bhar and Hamori (2008). Addition-
ally, Cheung (2009) finds evidence that the quality of commodity prices as indicator variables 
differs between commodity-exporting and commodity-importing countries. The quality of the 
signals is better for economies who export commodities. 
To deliver a reasonable conclusion of this section, one could follow Moosa (1998). Although 
commodity prices do not satisfy all the criteria mentioned before, they are useful indicators of 
future CPI inflation and thus policymakers should keep their developments in mind when de-
ciding about changes in monetary policy. However, Kyrtsou and Labys (2006) stress, that 
focussing on one single indicator would be too simple. As the connection between commodity 
and consumer prices is “chaotic” and “non-linear”, policymakers who consider various indi-
cators will probably make superior decisions. 
4. Empirical analysis 
In this section we make use of various econometric tools such as Granger causality tests and 
structural vector-autoregressive (SVAR) models to find out what the linkage between com-
modity prices and consumer prices might be like and how it might have changed over time. 
4.1 Data 
We make use of quarterly US data. Our sample ranges from 1967Q1 to 2007Q4.
10 The start-
ing date was chosen due to data availability. Although data are offered up to 2010Q2, we have 
decided to stop our investigation in 2007Q4. We do this because of the financial crisis, which 
probably leads to a structural break in the relationship under review. Indeed, the subprime 
10 Computing differences or rates of change of the variables will lead to a small reduction of the sample as the 
first observations drop out. We do not explicitly refer to this in the following. Therefore the denoted starting 
point of a sample and the “true” starting point may differ slightly. 11
crisis already started in the middle of 2007 but it intensified in September 2008 when the 
American investment bank Lehman Brothers collapsed. Hence, choosing 2007Q4 as the end 
of our sample is a compromise because our sample includes the pronounced rise in commod-
ity prices and the acceleration of consumer price inflation but omits the turbulences resulting 
from the financial market turmoil. For our econometric analysis we split the sample in two 
parts: an early sample ranging from 1967Q1-1983Q1 and another one from 1984Q1-2007Q4. 
The split is chosen in reference to Blomberg and Harris (1995), McConnell and Perez-Quiros 
(2000) and Blanchard and Galí (2008), who find a structural break in the middle of the 1980s. 
Our baseline model contains four endogenous variables with four lags each and a constant. 
The time series included are the Federal Funds Rate, the CRB index, the CPI and the GDP.
11
All series except the Federal Funds Rate are taken in natural logarithms. Furthermore, as the 
unit root tests presented in the next section advise, we use first differences of the time series. 
We use the Federal Funds Rate as the Fed’s operative instrument. Gerlach and Smets (1995) 
argue that this is a more appropriate measure of the stance of monetary policy because central 
banks usually set short term interest rates. Furthermore, the money base is susceptible to 
money demand shocks with the consequences that money aggregates do not deliver a clear 
reflection of the stance of monetary policy. 
Most of the data stem from the IMF, namely the consumer price index (CPI), the index of 
industrial production (IP), the Federal Funds Rate (FFR) and a time series of the GDP (GDP). 
The chosen commodity price index is the Commodity Research Bureau (CRB) index. We will 
use the Raw Industrials Sub-index (CRB_I) for robustness checks as well. The CRB Spot In-
dex is a broad commodity index which contains 19 different commodities such as oil, copper 
and coffee futures. Several sub indices are available, too. 
4.2 Unit root tests 
As the visual impression and the description of the data suggest, most of the time series con-
tained in the following econometric analysis tend to have a unit root as they exhibit a clear 
trend. Our unit root tests confirm this guess. The results are presented in table 1. When look-
ing at the time series of the logarithm of the CPI and its first difference, the null hypothesis of 
a unit root cannot be rejected for the first subsample. This is due to the two oil price shocks of 
the 1970s. Nevertheless, as the time series is stationary when considering the whole sample, 
11 As the unit root tests indicate, the CPI is possibly non-stationary. While this might dilute our results, we ad-
dress this issue in our robustness checks. 12
we regard the CPI as integrated of order one. For the time series of the Federal Funds Rate 
(FFR), the CRB index (CRB) and the GDP, the evidence is clear – both time series are I(1).
Table 1: Unit root tests 
 1967Q1-2007Q4  1967Q1-1983Q1  1984Q1-2007Q4 
Time  series  ADF PP ADF PP ADF PP 
LOG_CPI  -1.68 -0.36 -2.75 -1.89 -1.66 -1.48 
DLOG_CPI -3.05  -6.51***  -0.97 -2.30  -3.87**  -8.10*** 
LOG_CRB -2.51 -2.07 -2.08 -1.73 -0.98 -0.91 
DLOG_CRB -6.11***  -9.87***  -6.27*** -6.55*** -6.87*** -6.83*** 
FFR  -3.20*  -2.88 -2.02 -2.25 -2.98 -2.23 
D_FFR  -9.57***  -10.15***  -6.61*** -6.53*** -5.15*** -5.18*** 
LOG_GDP -0.00 -0.25 -2.02 -2.12 -3.03  -3.52** 
DLOG_GDP -10.27***  -10.48***  -6.95*** -6.95*** -4.68*** -7.05*** 
Null hypothesis: Time series contains a unit root/is not stationary. 
*, **, *** indicate a rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level. 
The test equations include a constant and a linear trend. A “D” at the beginning of the name of 
a time series means that the test is performed in first differences. Accordingly, “LOG” indi-
cates that we use the natural logarithm. 
4.3 Commodity prices and inflation – prima facie evidence 
Figure 1 displays the CRB Spot Index and annual CPI inflation. The first impression suggests 
a very close link between the CRB Spot index and the annual inflation rate from the begin-
ning of the sample in 1968Q1 up to the beginning of the 1980s. Afterwards, it seems that the 
relationship has somewhat weakened. This impression is supported when taking a look at cor-
relation coefficients. Regarding the whole sample, the correlation coefficient is -0.08. For the 
period from 1968Q1 to 1982Q4, the strong co-movement finds evidence in a correlation coef-
ficient of 0.81. Afterwards, only weak correlations of about less than 0.25 are detected. This 
finding supports the assumption that there is a connection between commodity prices and in-
flation. Nevertheless, it does not indicate a lead of commodity prices ahead of inflation. In 
fact, it corroborates the view that the connection has weakened during the last decades. 
Figure 2 displays the annual change of the CRB Spot Index and CPI inflation four quarters 
ahead. We can establish a close connection from the beginning of the period under review to 
the middle of the 1980s. From the beginning of the 1990s, the relation somewhat deteriorates. 13
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However, there seems to be a reinforcement starting at the beginning of the new millennium, 
whereas the lead of the CRB index might have grown a little. Correlation coefficients support 
this notion. Regarding the whole sample, yields a correlation coefficient of 0.49, which is 
strong compared to the small negative correlation of the level of the CRB index and CPI infla-
tion. Considering the period 1968Q1 to 1983Q4, there is even a stronger co-movement indi-
cated by a correlation coefficient of 0.62. When taking a look at the observations from 
2000Q1 to 2007Q4 we find the strongest correlation amounting to 0.61 at a lead of the CRB 
index of seven quarters.
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CRB Spot Index, annual change in % annual CPI inflation in %, 4 quarters ahead (rhs)14
4.4 Granger causality tests 
At first we will take a look at the CRB Spot Index and the CPI (table 2). Granger causality 
tests are carried out for different lag lengths for the whole sample, as well as for the two sub-
samples. To avoid problems of Granger causality tests with non-stationary time series, all 
tests are performed in first differences.
12
Table 2: Granger causality tests (CPI and CRB index) 
Lags  67Q1-07Q4 67Q1-83Q1 84Q1-07Q4 67Q1-07Q4 67Q1-83Q1 84Q1-07Q4 
1 1.919  3.309*  0.276  3.924**  9.982*** 2.736 
2 2.167 5.953*** 1.368  1.679 6.141*** 2.329 
3 1.892  3.948**  1.152  3.423**  5.940*** 2.341* 
4 1.612  3.261**  0.901 3.593***  7.534*** 2.084* 
5 1.176  1.873  0.701  3.035**  5.505*** 1.644 
6 1.059  1.658  0964  3.058***  3.747***  2.367** 
  Null: D_CPI does not Granger-cause D_CRB  Null: D_CRB does not Granger-cause D_CPI 
*, **, *** indicate a rejection of the null at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level 
Considering the whole sample, we have strong evidence that there is causation only in one 
direction. While there is no significant causation from the CPI to the CRB index, we find sig-
nificant causality at five of six lag lengths for the other direction. This supports our overall 
working hypothesis that commodity prices might be informative when thinking about future 
inflation. Furthermore, the analysis of the parted sample backs our visual impression that 
there might be a weaker link between commodity prices and the CPI today than 25 years ago. 
While we have significant two-way causation in the earlier period, there is only little evidence 
of causation from the CRB to the CPI in the period 1984Q1-2007Q4. 
In a next step, we take a look at the CRB index and CPI inflation. The results are shown in 
table 3. Here our assumptions gain further support. While there is no causality from CPI infla-
tion to the CRB at no lag in no sample, the picture is completely the opposite when taking a 
look at Granger-causation from the CRB index to CPI inflation. For the whole sample as well 
as for the first subsample, the null hypothesis of no causation from the CRB index to CPI in-
flation is rejected with a level of significance of 1%. For the sample 1984Q1 to 2007Q4 there 
12 The unit root tests are not presented here. 15
is only little indication of causation which supports our notion of a decreasing relationship 
between commodity prices and prices of consumer goods. 
Table 3: Granger causality tests (CPI inflation and CRB index) 
Lags  67Q1-07Q4 67Q1-83Q1 84Q1-07Q4 67Q1-07Q4 67Q1-83Q1 84Q1-07Q4 
1 0.154  1.125  0.003 17.321***  14.973*** 2.650 
2 0.131  0.740  1.994 9.378***  8.350***  3.123** 
3 0.454  0.150  1.860 7.680***  9.584*** 2.416* 
4 0.671  0.962  1.755 5.222***  8.751*** 0.926 
5 0.325  1.106  1.451 4.826***  7.276*** 0.775 
6 0.258  1.084  1.588 3.943***  5.476*** 0.986 
  Null: D_INFL does not Granger-cause D_CRB  Null: D_CRB does not Granger-cause D_INFL 
*, **, *** indicate a rejection of the null at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level 
Table 4: Granger causality tests (CPI inflation and annual change of CRB index) 
Lags 67Q1-07Q4  67Q1-83Q1  84Q1-07Q4  67Q1-07Q4 67Q1-83Q1 84Q1-07Q4 
1 0.034  0.308  1.578 25.233***  20.354***  2.173 
2 0.059  0.837  2.904*  15.804***  12.604***  2.641* 
3 0.498  1.584  2.568*  11.373***  8.566***  2.161* 
4 0.361  0.710  2.201* 6.644***  5.278***  2.499** 
5 0.412  0.590  2.287* 5.592***  4.460***  2.024* 
6 0.414  0.448  1.210 5.770***  4.026*** 1.666 
  Null: D_INFL does not Granger-cause CRB_GR  Null: CRB_GR does not Granger-cause D_INFL 
*, **, *** indicate a rejection of the null at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level 
Finally, we investigate whether there is Granger causality when considering annual changes 
for the CRB index and CPI inflation.
13 Table 4 displays the outcomes. When taking a look at 
the whole sample from 1967Q1 to 2007Q4 and the subsample from 1967Q1 to 1983Q1 we 
find strict causation from commodity prices to consumer goods inflation. All entries in col-
umns five and six of table 4 are significant at the 1%-level, whereas there is no significant 
entry in columns two and three. Considering our second subsample, we find two-way causa-
tion, which seems to be robust to the choice of the lag length but the significance is somewhat 
weaker. This finding supports the impression from figure 2. There, we had indications of a 
13 As unit root tests indicate (not shown here), the annual change of the CRB is already stationary, so we do not 
have to take first differences. 16
revival of the connection between CPI inflation and the CRB growth rate starting around the 
year 2000.
To sum up the results of our battery of Granger causality tests, we conclude that the prima 
facie evidence seems to give a good indication of what the relationship between commodity 
prices and consumer goods prices might be like. Furthermore, the economic theory presented 
in section two appears to be correct, as it delivers plausible arguments for a reduction of the 
link between commodity prices and the CPI. 
4.5 Methodology 
In the following we make use of so called structural or identified vector autoregressive 
(SVAR) models, which were introduced by Sargent (1979) and Sims (1980). Sims (1980) 
criticized structural economic models because to him their identification scheme is “incredi-
ble”. Large-scale models contain too many restrictions and are often highly overidentified. So 
he argues that VAR models should be used instead.
14
Due to the critique of the classical VAR methodology Sims (1981, 1986), Blanchard and 
Watson (1984) and Bernanke (1986) introduced a new class of VAR models which is called 
structural or identified VAR. Identification of the model is reached not by an ad hoc Choleski 
decomposition but by restrictions for the error terms derived from economic theory. In gen-
eral, one imposes just as many restrictions as necessary to just identify the system.  
Equation (1) shows a structural economic model with n endogenous variables and a constant.  
For writing purposes, we take up just one lag.
15 Furthermore, we assume that the structural 
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1 1 0     (1) 
14 Although VAR models are frequently used in econometrics, there is also some critique. See, for instance Coo-
ley and LeRoy (1985). 
15 To find out the appropriate lag length of the system one can use information criteria such as the Akaike or 
Schwarz criterion. 17
By premultiplying both sides of equation (1) with the inverse of B  denoted as 
1  B  one gets 
the reduced form of (1): 
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The structural shocks  t e  can be computed from the reduced form error terms  t u  by  t t u B e 	 

(equation (3)). To identify the model, it is necessary to impose some restrictions on the pa-
rameter matrix B . When there are n variables in the system, one has to implement 
2
) 1 (  n n
restrictions on the matrixB . So for a four variable VAR, six restrictions must be found to just 
identify the system. 
(3)
Starting with the first equation, we restrict  13 b  and  14 b  to zero (Sims and Zha, 1998). This 
implies that monetary policy cannot respond contemporaneously to developments in con-
sumer prices and output due to lags in statistical publications. We do not restrict  12 b  because 
data for commodity prices are available daily and so it is possible for central bankers to in-
clude commodity price developments in their decision making. Turning to the commodity 
price equation, we do not restrict any coefficient to zero. We justify this by the fact that com-
modity prices are forward-looking and will probably respond to new information quite fast. In 
line three of matrix B , we restrict  31 b , 32 b  and  34 b  to zero. We do this because we assume 
that the consumer price level is predetermined (McCoy, 1997). Consumer prices will not react 
immediately to changes in economic activity, commodity prices or monetary policy. The 
slower reaction of consumer prices in comparison with commodity prices can be advocated 
with the economic theory of section two as well. Finally, we impose the restriction  0 41 
 b .
By doing this we assume that the output reacts to changes in monetary policy only with a lag 

















































































Figure 3 and 4 show the impulse response functions for the two subsamples of our baseline 
model with 95% error bands. Each row mirrors the reaction of one variable to the four differ-
ent shocks. Accordingly, each column shows the reaction of the variables to one specific 
shock. In reference to the scope of this paper, we are mainly interested in the impulse re-
sponses in the first column, as we can find there the reaction of the variables to a monetary 
policy shock. Beyond this, the impulse response of the CPI to a CRB shock and vice versa is 
of special interest.  













































































































































































Regarding figure 3, showing the results for the 1967Q1-1983Q3 sample, we detect a reduction 
of commodity prices and consumer prices after a restrictive monetary policy, i.e. a raise of the 
Federal Funds Rate. Commodity prices decrease immediately (and significantly), consumer 
prices decline significantly not until one year. This fits our hypothesis of a fast reaction of 
commodity prices in comparison to consumer prices quite well. As commodity prices react 19
instantaneously, we can explain the finding of a reduction in interest rates after a tightening of 
monetary policy. The monetary authority gets the feedback by the reaction of commodity 
prices that the means applied are working and therefore monetary policy returns to the previ-
ous path of a less tight policy indicated by a reduction of the Federal Funds Rate.
16 Further-
more, the response pattern of the CPI is what is usually expected when thinking about mone-
tary policy transmission. A more restrictive monetary policy should decrease the price level. 
For the period 1967Q1-1983Q1 we cannot identify a “price puzzle”, which is a rise of con-
sumer prices after a more restrictive monetary policy. This makes us confident that we have 
identified monetary policy correctly (Hanson, 2004). 
Another interesting result emerges when taking a look at the reaction of the CPI to a structural 
CRB shock and vice versa. We identify an immediate and significant rise of consumer prices 
to an exogenous increase of the CRB index. Thus, commodity prices influence the evolution 
of the CPI. When we regard the reaction of commodity prices to an increase in consumer 
prices we detect only an insignificant albeit rectified reaction. This somewhat reflects the 
Granger causality tests for the first subsample presented in table 2. 
In addition we can find a significant rise in interest rates both for a commodity price shock 
and a CPI shock. This underlines the connection between monetary policy, commodity prices 
and inflation as well. 
Taking now a look at the other impulse response functions, we detect an anticyclical monetary 
policy. We see that a demand shock, i.e. an unanticipated rise in the GDP growth rate, leads to 
a significant rise in interest rates. This is what one would expect because central bankers and 
especially the Fed have to take a look at the economic performance as well. Considering the 
other impulse response functions we find no significant change in the GDP growth rate to 
shocks in both the consumer and commodity price level. Beyond this we see a significant rise 
in the consumer price level after an increase in the GDP. This can be explained by rising de-
mand which fuels inflationary pressure.  
Focussing now on figure 4, displaying the results for the period 1984Q1-2007Q4, the first 
impression we get is that we have far less significant reactions than in the first sample. This 
finding is corroborated by Herrera and Pesavento (2009). We take this as a sign of a decreas-
ing relationship between commodity prices and the overall economic situation. Considering 
the reaction of the two price indices to a monetary policy shock we do not find any significant 
                                                
16 These findings allow the statement that for the first subsample commodity prices might not have been only an 
indicator variable for central bankers but an intermediate target as well. 20
response neither of the CRB nor of the CPI. At least the tendency of the response functions is 
correct and the time path fits the story of a quicker reaction of commodity prices. Additionally, 
we do not find a price puzzle. As we cannot detect any significant response of the CRB index 
to monetary policy, the CRB index cannot be seen as an intermediate target. 









































































































































































For the response of consumer prices to a CRB shock, we do not find a significant reaction. 
This is documented by Furlong and Ingenito (1996) as well. They use a bivariate VAR of 
consumer and commodity prices. Their split sample analysis with a structural break at the end 
of 1983 exhibits a response pattern similar to ours. While the CPI rises significantly after a 
shock to the CRB index considering the period from1973M01-1983M12, they do not find 
such a reaction when looking at the period from 1984M01-1995M11. 
The same holds true for the reaction of the CRB index to an unanticipated rise in the CPI 
growth rate. We cannot detect a significant response. Thus our hypothesis of a decreasing or 
even disappearing relationship gains support from these impulse response functions. Consid-21
ering the other impulse response functions we again find an anticyclical monetary policy indi-
cated by a rise in interest rates to an increase in the GDP growth rate. 
In a next step we will take a look at variance decompositions to find additional support for our 
hypothesis. Variance decompositions allow us to distinguish whether commodity price swings 
are important in explaining changes in consumer prices. Table 5 and 6 display the variance 
decompositions for the two subsamples. 
Table 5: Variance decompositions, 1967Q1-1983Q1, baseline model 
    Quarter  FFR CRB CPI GDP 
Decomposi-
tion of FFR
1 8.02  68.02 22.28  1.68 
2  17.52 51.66 15.49 15.34 
3  17.97 51.21 13.73 17.08 
4  17.62 49.01 16.98 16.39 
Decomposi-
tion of CRB
1 61.96  28.13  9.22  0.70 
2  56.05 25.56 15.65  2.74 
3  56.10 24.97 16.16  2.78 
4  54.90 24.02 15.58  5.49 
Decomposi-
tion of CPI 
1 0.00  0.00 100.00 0.00 
2 1.34  16.33 78.13  4.20 
3 3.67  18.07 71.87  6.38 
4  10.35 16.17 65.12  8.36 
Decomposi-
tion of GDP
1  0.11 0.05 5.36  94.48 
2  2.56 5.05 9.43  82.96 
3  5.00 11.16 9.75 74.09 
4 6.09  13.96 10.31 69.64 
Table 5 gives the results for the 1967Q1-1983Q1 sample. Starting with the variance decom-
position of the change of the Federal Funds Rate we find that it is primarily the CRB index 
which explains the variation of monetary policy. About one half of the variation in the Federal 
Funds Rate is due to changes in commodity prices. This is somewhat surprising as the Fed is 
concerned about consumer price stability rather than commodity prices. However, remember-
ing the economic theory and the empirical evidence up to now, we know that commodity 
prices can serve as indicator variables for monetary policy. Additionally, we should keep in 
mind that monetary policy is likely to react to macroeconomic conditions. Variations in the 
Federal Funds Rate should be explained by macroeconomic variables as can be seen here. 
Turning to the CRB decomposition in table 5 we see that monetary policy has got strong in-
fluences on commodity prices as well. Variation in commodity prices is explained to around 
55% by changes in interest rates. These outcomes underline once more that there is a strong 22
link between monetary policy and commodity prices in the time of the first two oil price 
shocks.
For consumer prices, shocks of the CRB index, the GDP or the interest rate have got similar 
magnitudes of about 10%-15%. A comparable result is presented by Garner (1989). In his 
model commodity prices account for one fourth of the variation in the CPI. Regarding GDP, it 
is its own shock that dominates its variance. All other shocks account each for about 10% of 
the variance in output. 
The variance decompositions for the 1984Q1-2007Q4 sample are shown in table 6. We can 
verify our guess of a lower influence of commodity prices for monetary policy. Changes in 
commodity prices no longer dominate the evolution of the Federal Funds Rate. Although 
variations in the CRB index account for about 30% of the variance in interest rates, this is a 
clear reduction compared to the 55% in the 1967Q1-1983Q1 sample. Hence, we can conclude 
that monetary policy has responded less to commodity price developments, probably knowing 
that the quality of the signals sent by commodity prices has deteriorated. The influence of 
changes in output has increased. One explanation of this finding might be that in the course of 
the Great Moderation central bankers could focus more and more on smoothing the business 
cycle and supporting the economic activity than fighting inflation. This argument is somewhat 
sustained by the reduced influence of changes in consumer prices for monetary policy 
changes. Nevertheless, macroeconomic conditions still account for a large part of the varia-
tion in the Federal Funds Rate. 
Moving on to the variance decomposition of the rate of change of the CRB index, we see that 
monetary policy changes account for far less variation than in the first subsample. This allows 
the conclusion that monetary policy is no longer able to influence commodity prices and that 
the overall link between monetary policy and commodity prices has decreased.
The last two variance decompositions shown in table 6, exhibit the same pattern. For both, it 
is about 90% the own shock that accounts for variations in the time series. All other factors 
are negligible. For the CPI the influence of commodity prices decreased. While changes in the 
CRB index account for about 15% of the variation in the CPI in the early sample, the influ-
ence of the CRB index sinks to less than 5%. This finding is corroborated by Furlong and 
Ingenito (1996). Their variance decompositions for bivariate VAR models exhibit the same 
pattern. For the more recent sample the CRB index accounts for only 11% in the variation of 
the CPI, while it was about 30% considering the earlier sample. 23
Table 6: Variance decompositions, 1984Q1-2007Q4, baseline model 
    Quarter  FFR CRB CPI GDP 
Decomposi-
tion of FFR
1 55.87  36.80  2.10  5.22 
2 42.54  33.02  2.97  21.46 
3 39.95  29.53  3.69  26.83 
4 39.06  28.56  5.24  27.14 
Decomposi-
tion of CRB
1 23.35  63.93  3.65  9.07 
2 21.86  60.47  3.67  14.00 
3 20.72  60.06  6.02  13.20 
4 20.31  60.93  6.05  12.71 
Decomposi-
tion of CPI 
1 0.00  0.00 100.00 0.00 
2 0.13  1.75  97.49  0.62 
3 2.23  1.82  90.84  5.11 
4 2.78  2.55  89.78  4.89 
Decomposi-
tion of GDP
1  0.58 1.58 1.72  96.13 
2  1.23 3.95 1.57  93.25 
3  1.69 3.60 1.90  92.81 
4  1.69 6.53 2.40  89.39 
Summarising the results from the variance decompositions, we can say that the findings con-
firm the results presented in the impulse response analysis. The connection between monetary 
policy, commodity prices and inflation is weaker than it was in the period before the 1980s. 
This notion is held by Blanchard and Galí (2008) as well. Although they focus on oil price 
shocks and their relation to the overall economic performance, they report a shrinking influ-
ence of oil price movements on prices. Another study that corroborates our results is that of 
Furlong and Ingenito (1996). They take a look at bivariate VAR models for commodity prices 
and inflation. They use rolling regressions as well as VAR models for subperiods and con-
clude that commodity prices were reliable indicators for CPI inflation in the 1970s up to the 
beginning of the 1980s. Afterwards, the performance of commodity prices as a leading indica-
tor of consumer prices considerably deteriorates. A comparable approach is found in De 
Gregorio et al. (2007). They use rolling regressions with a length of 200 months and investi-
gate the pass-through of oil prices to consumer prices for various countries. They find a de-
clining pass-through of oil prices to the general price level. However, for the US they detect 
reinforcement in the recent years.
17 Herrera and Pesavento (2009) document similar results as 
ours. Although they focus on the effect of oil price shocks, their approach has various inter-
sections with ours: they use quarterly data, incorporate four lags in their VAR model and split 
their sample in the middle of the 1980s. Their findings of a decreased influence of oil price 
shocks on prices in the second subperiod strongly resemble our results. 
                                                
17 We find small hints of a possible revival as well. 24
4.7 Robustness checks 
Although our baseline model seems to be well specified when regarding the diagnostic tools, 
there might be problems due to the fact that the time series of the CPI is likely to be non-
stationary in our first sample. Hence, it is advisable to check the results from our model and 
perform some robustness checks. 
First, we replace the time series of the CPI in our VAR model by the annual inflation rate. 
Because for the inflation rate, the results of unit root tests are mixed, we include the inflation 
rate in first differences. Model diagnostic tests exhibit similar results like the baseline model. 
Regarding the impulse response functions, we get nearly the same results with only slight 
differences for both samples.
18 For the first period we now find a significant reduction in the 
growth rate of the GDP in response to a tightening of monetary policy. This reduction takes 
place after three quarters and so two quarters before the consumer prices level significantly 
shrinks. So this modification fits better the generally accepted timing of the monetary trans-
mission process. Apart from that we cannot find any striking differences, in fact, the response 
patterns seem to be duplicates of the ones from our baseline model. The same holds true for 
the second sample. The only difference we detect is a significant rise of the Federal Funds 
Rate after an unexpected increase in the commodity price index. However, this is due to 
smaller error bands at the beginning in comparison with the impulse response function re-
ceived from the baseline specification. The response patterns in both cases are almost the 
same. Variance decompositions support the finding of no dramatic change. For the first period, 
we detect a less strong influence of monetary policy in determining the evolution of the CRB 
index. For the 1984Q1-2007Q4 sample we cannot find any eye-catching differences at all. 
In a next step we replace the GDP by the index of industrial production (the CPI has returned 
to our model). The use of the industrial production can be justified by the fact that commodi-
ties are used especially in the manufacturing sector and not in the service sector. So the index 
of industrial production might be a more appropriate activity measure than the GDP because 
the GDP consists largely of services which are independent of commodity price changes. 
Again we find no evidence of severe misspecification and the impulse response functions for 
the first period show the same pattern. We just detect a stronger rise in the consumer price 
level after an increase in industrial production. Variance decompositions corroborate the re-
sults from the baseline model, too. The impulse response functions and the variance decom-
positions derived for the second period strongly resemble the results from the baseline model. 
                                                
18 The figures are not shown here because they exhibit no dramatic changes. However, they are available upon 
request. 25
Solely the variance decompositions of the change in the Federal Funds Rate and the growth 
rate of the CRB index do differ from the results obtained by the baseline model. Movements 
of commodity prices and consumer prices account for about 70% of the variations in mone-
tary policy. The Federal Funds Rate’s own shock is not the main influence as it is in the base-
line model. For the variance decomposition of the rate of change of the CRB index we find 
that the Federal Funds Rate, the CPI and the index of industrial production account for a lar-
ger part of the variation than it was the case in the baseline model. The CRB’s own influence 
sinks from 60% to 45%. 
Finally, we replace the broad commodity price index by the CRB Raw Industrials Sub-index 
(in log differences), but once more there are no large differences in impulse response func-
tions. We should only mention the finding that for the period 1984Q1 to 2007Q4 the CRB 
Raw Industrials Sub-index accounts for about 60% of the variance of the changes in interest 
rates and monetary policy is responsible for almost 60% of the variance in the CRB sub-index. 
This is somehow against the results we have presented till now because it suggests that there 
still might be a link between monetary policy and commodity prices. Thus, further research 
could be addressed this issue, whether there are narrow commodity prices aggregates or spe-
cial commodity prices such as gold which can serve as indicator variables for monetary policy 
today.
Our next step in robustness analysis is to change the identification pattern of the VAR model. 
For simplicity we will perform these checks only for the baseline model. At first, we allow a 
contemporaneous reaction of monetary policy to output and consumer prices, i.e. we do no 
longer restrict  13 b  and  14 b  in the matrix in equation (3) to zero. We do this because central 
bankers might have indicator variables they consider when taking policy decisions. In return 
we restrict  23 b  and  42 b  to zero. We justify this with the thought of delivery contracts that pre-
serve enterprises to react immediately to changes in production when commodity prices alter. 
While most of the impulse response functions do not change a lot, the price puzzle occurs 
when considering the first subsample. We take this as an indication of misspecification and do 
not go into detail concerning the impulse response functions and variance decompositions. 
Alternatively, we try several Choleski orderings as proposed by Sims (1986). For the ar-
rangement of the variables we follow the advice of Favero (2001) to put monetary variables 
last because they are supposed to react faster than other variables. The first ordering we test is 
output, consumer prices, commodity prices and interest rates. The impulse response functions 
exhibit several differences. Neither for the first nor for the second sample, we detect a signifi-26
cant response of the CRB index to a tightening of monetary policy. For the first period under 
review, we even find a small increase in consumer prices in response to a more restrictive 
monetary policy. Nevertheless, at least the response pattern with a reduction after several 
quarters fits economic theory (although the response is not significant). The variance decom-
positions now exhibit that most of the variation in a variable is explained by its own shock. 
This holds true especially for the second sample under review. 
Changing the CRB index and the Federal Funds Rate in the Choleski ordering yields even a 
more explicit price puzzle and we cannot find a significant response of commodity prices to a 
rise in the Federal Funds Rate in the first sample but besides this, there are no substantial 
changes. What we mentioned for the variance decompositions with the first Choleski ordering 
applies here as well. 
5. Conclusion and policy implications 
The past years were characterized by unprecedented rises in prices of commodities such as oil 
or wheat and inflation rates moved up above the mark of two percent per annum which is 
typically referred to as price stability. This led to a debate whether commodity prices indicate 
future CPI inflation and if they can be used as indicator variables for central banks.
To answer this question, we have investigated what the connection between commodity prices 
and inflation is like in the US. After having looked at the economic theory which delivers 
reasons for and against a relationship between prices of both sorts of goods, we applied vari-
ous econometric methods like Granger causality tests and SVAR models to answer this ques-
tion.
All these tools pointed to one conclusion. While there was a strong link between commodity 
prices and CPI inflation in the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, the relationship has 
weakened, respectively diminished over time. Today we are unable to detect a reaction of 
commodity prices to commodity price shocks. Thus, commodity prices might not serve as 
good indicator variables for monetary policy. Our results are pretty in line with the findings of 
Furlong and Ingenito (1996), De Gregorio et al. (2007) and Herrera and Pesavento (2009). In 
all these papers a reduced relationship between commodity prices and inflation is documented. 
One starting point for further analyses is to enlarge the VAR model to be able to distinguish 
which factor named in the second section is responsible for the weakening of the relationship 
between commodity prices and inflation. Another promising approach might be to investigate 27
whether there is a revival of the link in the last few years.  De Gregorio et al. (2007) hint at 
this and we have found little evidence of reinforcement as well. However, right now this is 
somewhat difficult to investigate with econometric methods because of few observations, 
especially when using quarterly data. Moreover, Krichene (2008) speculates if it is simply too 
early to detect such a recovery because of the monetary transmission mechanism which may 
take some more time. 
Regarding our results, we would not use commodity prices as an indicator variable for mone-
tary policy. At the moment, policymakers should not take commodity price changes as signals 
for future CPI inflation. As seen, the rise of commodity prices was merely temporary and we 
have noticed a sharp drop after the records reached in 2007 and 2008. Thus, these swings in 
commodity markets reflect probably to a large extent speculative behaviour of investors. The 
ample and cheap liquidity available on international financial markets searches for yield and 
as interest rates are quite low, commodities might be a worthwhile alternative for investments. 
Furthermore, a more restrictive monetary policy in face of rising commodity prices could de-
press economic activity. This is problematic especially for the Fed as she has to focus on price 
stability and the support of the economic performance of the American economy. Regarding 
the actual financial crisis, putting more weight on stimulating the economic activity might be 
superior to eliminate inflationary pressure. Additionally, higher inflation rates as a conse-
quence of the fairly expansionary monetary policy would come along with a (to some minds) 
nice side effect of devaluating the governmental debt. Therefore, keeping interest rates low 
might lead to a reduction of the deficit relative to GDP for two reasons: higher growth rates 
decrease debt relative to GDP and inflation erodes the real value of the debt. 
Nevertheless, central banks should monitor if commodity prices will influence inflation ex-
pectations. As food and petrol are goods which are bought quite frequently, a rise in these 
commodity prices can increase inflation expectations, with the risk of a stronger influence of 
commodity prices on the CPI in the future. So the hypothesis of a revival is not so far off 
which points to no quietening of the discussion about commodity prices, monetary policy and 
inflation. 28
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